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When Judicial Agreement Seems Impossible :
warren Burger, David Bazelon, and the D.C . Court of Appeals*
CH A RLES M. LAMB

State University of New York at Buffalo

Introduction
At all levels of American appellate courts, judges often attempt to
reach unanimous decisions to generate an image of judicial consensus. Yet,
of course, they cannot always achieve unanimity. Judicial agreement is impossible at times because of differing interpretations of salient legal issues in
pending cases, the application and extension of precedents, or concerns
over the potential or probable impacts of new decisions on the political,
legal, and economic systems. Or agreement may be unlikely for more personal reasons such as differences in attitudes and ideologies, role conceptions, competition for influence on a court, or more general forms of interpersonal friction or rivalry.
Judges therefore naturally encounter peers with whom they disagree
for a variety of reasons, and such relations may become clearly conflictual
in nature. Moreover, since judges do not always act as one, the existence of
conflict is not necessarily a well kept secret. In a rare television interview in
December, 1982, Justice Harry A. Blackmun candidly observed that most
cases cau se friction in the Supreme Court. Although the interview primarily
focused on abortion decisions, Justice Blackmun spoke about interpersonal
relations on the Burger Court generally. These relations, he noted, are "very
competitive, very clashing ... in the sense that there are opposing views in
most of our cases." Blackmun added that "friendship and the mutual
respect ... continues. But if someone's going to play hardball with me, I'll
play hardball back if I firmly believe in the position." He even suggested
that reports of conflict on the Burger Court as portrayed in The Brethren '
were not altogether false and stated that if the book promoted a more informed public understanding of how the Supreme Court actually functions,
"I think maybe it served a purpose. " 2
The existence of such conflict on collegial courts at both the federal
and state levels has thus been of interest to students of judicial behavior for
many year s. 3 Broadly speaking, the literature indicates that conflict may
range from personal animus to cloaked disacco.rd. The occurrence of sustained disagreement also underscores and punctuates the political dynamics
and implications of judicial decision-making. Sheldon Goldman expressed
it well in 1968, after a painstaking and seminal study of conflict on the
United States Courts of Appeals, when he concluded that "it is clear that the
appeals courts are political institutions that make policy concerning "'who
gets what , when, and how,'" that they "function by an interplay of institutional, per sonality, attitudinal, and ideological variables," and that
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therefore dissent behavior on appellate courts provides "a rich mine of
political data ... to be explored.'"
A well-known example of " acerbic battles" 5 between promine nt federa]
judges involves Warren E. Burger and David L. Bazelon, each of whorn
have served since the 1950s on federal appellate courts. Burger an d Bazelon
sat together on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colu mbia circuit between 1956 and 1969, with Bazelon acting as Chief Judge of the coun
for the last seven years of that period. Prior to his elevation to the Suprene
Court in 1969, Burger participated in an ongoing rivalry with Baze lon, and
in the words of one of their colleagues, they "were at swords' point. " 6
Two principal reasons for this inability to agree were the att itudinal
differences between Judges Burger and Bazelon over criminal justice issues'
and the fact that they apparently disliked each other personally. 8 Students
of background analysis would probably also add that voting conflic t would
be highly likely between Burger and Bazelon, the former being a Pro testant
Republican, the latter being a Jewish Democrat. 9 However, whi le some of
the causes of this rivalry are known, it has never been studied in dept h. Based
chiefly on the research of Burton Atkins and Sheldon Goldma n , political
scientists are generally aware only of the existence of voting co nflict between Burger and Bazelon at the macro level of analysis. ' 0 By co ntra st, this
article explores at a micro level aspects of the conflict betwee n Judges
Burger and Bazelon by examining their criminal justice voting behavior on
the D.C. circuit between 1956 and 1969. In promoting an understa nding of
the behavior of Judges Burger and Bazelon, the article demonstra tes some
basic ways in which students of judicial behavior may approach research on
conflict and suggests how the differences between three-judge and en bane
panels ostensibly affect conflictual interactions in courts as sma ll groups.

Research Design
Judicial conflict is operationally defined here in terms of voting
disagreement in non unanimous cases, as have many prior studies." Under
this definition, the magnitude of judicial conflict increases in direct proportion to increases in the percentage of cases in which Judges Bur ger and
Baze lon disagreed. This definition, if anything, tends to unde restimate the
actual amount of conflict between Burger and Bazelon since disse nsus is not
measured here in unanimous decisions as has recent researc h by Burton
Atkins, Justin Green, and Donald Songer. 12
Four hypotheses are tested in this article. First, based on previous
reports, ' 3 we would expect the magnitude of conflict between J udges Burger
and Bazelon in criminal justice cases to be substantially grea ter than between Burger and his other appeals court colleagues. Second, we would anticipate that conflict between Burger and Bazelon wou ld be most evident
when the en bane procedure is used. This expectation reflects pri or findings
that the en bane procedure tends to increase or underscore intracirc uit conflict.,. Third, we would hypothesize that while conflict betwe~n Judges
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Burger and Bazelon would be intense, it also would vary over time,
omewhat as demonstrated by related Supreme Court research. " This is
theoretically logical since there is no apparent reason to believe that highly
controversial issues over which judges would virtually always disagree are
necessarily appealed to collegial courts in a consistent longitudinal pattern.
finally, a related hypothesi
would involve the expectation that the
magnitude of voting disagreement between Judges Burger and Bazelon
would grow over time because of deteriorating interpersonal relations. In
other words, personal dislike should aggrevate judicial relations and be increasingly reflected at least to some extent in voting behavior.
Because of the focus on Judges Burger and Bazelon, the data base conj t of the 109 nonunanimous
criminal justice cases in which they jointly
participated from 1956 to 1969. Reliance was placed on the "descriptive
word" and "topic" methods of the Federal Reporter, Second Series for
data collection and classification. The approach consisted of several steps.
The "criminal law" category in the index of each volume was first inspected
for the 14 years under consideration, and criminal justice subheadings were
examined for appropriate topics. After discovering all nonunanimous cirrninal justice panels on which both Burger and Bazelon sat, the size of the
data base permitted the reading of each case to insure against misclas ifications based on subject matter. Then other topics relating to criminal justice
i sues were cross-referenced to guard against the omission of pertinent
case . Regarding consolidated cases, all those causing a division on the
court were considered separate cases for the universe of data. Opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part were classified either as a dissent or a
concurrence, depending on the principal thrust of a judge's opinion. This
determination was made only after a careful reading of all opinions and
eems to be a viable alternative to assigning automatically a numerical
weight to voting positions without reading the opinions themselves, 16
especially where a relatively small data base exists.
It should be noted, too, that only very elementary methods are relied
on in this article. Inferential statistics and the reporting of levels of
ignificance are unnecessary since the population is the data base, and we
are not generalizing about other judges or courts. Indeed, some of the most
authorative past research suggests that such generalizations to other federal
courts of appeals might be rather difficult since they "differ in their rates of
dis ention and intracircuit conflict as well as the sources of conflict." 17

Findings
The data in Table I shed light on the first hypothesis. Table I shows
that in nonunanimous criminal justice decisions, Warren Burger maintained
an obvious conflictual voting relationship between 1956 and 1969 with five
judges, not just with Bazelon. Burger's highest rate of disagreement did indeed o :cur with David Bazelon. However, its magnitude (19.3 percent) is
not that pronounced when compared to Burger's voting disagreement with
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Judges J. Skelly Wright, Henry Edgerton, Spottswood Robinson, and
Charles Fahy. When judges disagree in more than two -thirds of al)
nonunanimous cases, it is reasonable to say that a relatively stro ng level of
conflict exists. Therefore, despite reports of conflict specifica lly between
Burger and Bazelon, we would conclude that they are somewhat misleading
since Burger also experienced substantial levels of voting conflict with four
other members of the D.C. circuit.
TABLE 1
Voting Agreement Between Judge Burger and His Colleagues
In Nonunanimous Criminal Justice Cases, 1956-1969*
Judge

Percentage of
Agreement

Bastian
Bazelon
Danaher
Edgerton
Fahy
Leventhal
McGowan

75.4
19.3
87. 7
26.6
32.5
50.0
47.6

(43/ 57)
(21/ 109)
(57 / 65)
(17 / 64)
(26/ 80)
(6/ 12)
(10/21)

Judge

Percentag e of
Agree ment

Miller
Prettyman
Robinson
Tamm
Washington
Wright

63.0
86.3
22.2
94.7
51.7
25.0

(46/7 3)
(44/ 51)
(2/ 9)
(18/19)
(30/ 58)
(10/ 40)

*Data in this table include all joint participations between Burger and
his D. C. circuit colleagues from 1956-1969, not just panels on which both
Burger and Bazelon served.
Table 2 permits the testing of the other three hypotheses by presenting
data, disaggregated into three-judge and en bane panels, for all nonunanimous criminal justice cases in which Judges Burger and Bazelon jointly participated. Clearly, the second hypothesis also is not substantiate d by the
data. Burger and Bazelon agreed in just 5.4 percent of all nonuna nimous
three-judge panels but in 34 percent of all nonunanimous en bane panels.
Thus, while conflict is generally more evident on a court of appeals when it
decides cases en bane, these findings suggest that judges who are regularly
in disagreement may exhibit a higher magnitude of conflict in three-j udge
than en bane panels. This is undoubtedly explained in part by small group
dynamics as more judges must be bargained with in an en bane setting."
This, in turn, may make decision-making more complicated given the larger
group and deflate the magnitude of voting conflict between particular
judges . Obviously it is easier to dissent in a three-judge panel which contains a rival judge than where there is a total of nine judges, as on the D.C.
circuit during these years, seeking to hammer out an agreement. Co nflict
between individual judges may therefore be suppressed in the process of
majority coalition building in en bane panels.
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TABLE 2
Voting Agreement Between Judges Burger and Bazelon in Nonunanimous
Three-Judge and En Banc Criminal Justice Cases, 1956- 1969
Year

1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
Totals

Three-Judge

0/ 10
0/2
2/ 9
1/ 2
0/ 2
0/ 1
0/ 4
0/ 3
0/ 3
0/ 5
0/ 5
0/ 3
0/ 4
0/ 3
3/ 56

Panels

En Banc Panel s
0/ 2
2/ 4
3/ 4
2/5
0/ 2
2/ 6
4/ 6
015
4/ 5
0/ 8
l/ l

0/ 3
0/ 1
0/ 1
18/ 53

With respect to the third hypothesis, we would again conclude that it
should be discarded for three-judge panels, based on the data in Table 2.
Judges Burger and Bazelon disagreed from the outset in three-judge panels,
and the magnitude of conflict between them did not vary substantially over
time. Additionally, when Bazelon became Chief Judge of the court in I 963
and oversa w rotation assignments in three-judge panels, he apparently did
not shy away from conflict with Burger. With the exception of I 956 and
1958, Burger and Bazelon tended to serve together on a slightly higher
number of three-judge panels beginning in 1963 than before Bazelon
became Chief Judge of the circuit. The third hypothesis does, however,
receive some modicum of support regarding en bane panels. Conflict was
highest in 1956, 1960, 1963, 1965, and 1967-1969, while being more
moderate in the remaining seven years. Yet, once more, small group interactions within the en bane setting, such as those mentioned regarding the second hypothesis, may well account for most or all of this longitudinal variation in conflict magnitude.
Nor is the fourth hypothesis supported by the data in Table 2. There is
no clear relationship between magnitude of voting conflict and time even
though Judges Burger and Bazelon apparently became more personally
alienated as the years passed. They disagreed in a large majority of
nonunanimous three-judge and en bane criminal justice cases as soon as
they became colleagues in 1956, and no dramatic variation in disagreement
is evident longitudinally. As some have suggested,' 9 perhaps interpersonal
~riction is reflected to some extent in the data because the degree of conflict
is very intense. However, by examining their behavior in three-judge and en
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bane panels, we certainly cannot demonstrate empirically that inter personal
friction contributed to an increase in the magnitude of voting co nflict ove
time. Therefore, if Burger and Bazelon experienced a growth in persona~
animosity toward each other, it doe not urface in this particu lar analysis.
Apparently, despite any dislike which may have existed, factors such as ro)e
con traints or samll group interactions may have camo u flag ed any
growth in personal animu that might otherwi e be detected in voting patterns.

Conclusions
Given previously reported relations between Judges Warre n E . Burger
and David L. Bazelon, this article provides a case study of two prominent
federal judges and indicates some ways in which conflict may be analyzed
by students of judicial behavior. Specifically, it has tested fou r hypothe es
based on the 109 nonunanimously decided criminal justice cases in which
Burger and Bazelon jointly participated on the D .C. circuit betwe en 1956
and 1969. Contrary to our four hypotheses, it was found that the magnitude
of voting conflict between Burger and Bazelon was not substantia lly greater
than Burger' rate of disagreement with four other D.C. circuit j udge , that
Burger and Bazelon were more likely to disagree in three-judge than in en
bane panels, and chat the magnitude of their voting conflict did not
significantly vary or increa e over time regardle s of reported inte rper sonal
friction. Certainly voting conflict does not necessarily, or even in a izable
minority of cases, mean that "personal dislike" is being exhibited.
Reasonable men can indeed agree to di agree-a
simple fact that must
always be kept in mind when exploring patterns of judicial voti ng conflict.
As Sheldon Goldman observed after interviewing 27 appeals co urt judges,
interpersonal dislike is rare on the courts of appeals, and "(t] he frequent
shifting of panel membership, it would seem, deters the develo pment or aggrevations of personality conflicts. " 20
These findings suggest that future research could profitably examine in
depth the relationships between other appellate court judges, both federal
and state, to determine if past generalizations about their conflict ual or consensual relations are in fact quantitatively verifiable. Beyond att itudinal , in
terpersonal, and background differences that may exist betwee n appellate
court judges, such re earch should also draw upon some of the ba sic theory
and findings of small group analysis, as this article suggests. In terms of
small group theory, it seems clear that Judges Burger and Baze lon were
essentially using sanctions against each other by consi tently vot ing on the
opposite side of is ues, not being concerned about alienating eac h other for
purposes of future coalition building. 21 Sanctions were also occ asionally
used via strongly worded dissents authored by both judges whe n the other
wrote majority opinions for the court. 22 Eclectic approaches exploring
conflict on American appellate courts, using a combination of tr aditional
and behavioral analy is, will significantly a sist political scientists in better
understanding judicial conflict in the future.
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